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Proposed Revision of the Ultra
Vires Doctrine
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE*
The doctrine of ultra vires had its origin in judicial deduction from
the fictional conception of corporations as artificial persons, creatures
of the law, which have no existence, powers or capacity except those
granted by statute. Hence a contract made in the name of the
corporation for purposes not included in the articles, although by
authority of all the directors, and even with the consent of all the
stockholders, has been held by some courts not to be attributable to
the corporation at all. The doctrine was not originated to accomplish
in scientific fashion the just protection of the legitimate interests and
expectations of the various parties concerned, such as the security of
third persons in their dealings with corporate representatives, but
"having been once created, it is now probably saddled onto the backs
of the courts, like Sinbad's Old Man of the Sea, not to be shaken off."'
The Committee on a Uniform Incorporation Act in its report to
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1924 included a pro-
vision, Section seven, as to the effect of ultra vires acts. This ninth
tentative draft of a uniform incorporation act was the first to contain
any provision with respect to the subject of ultra vires. Since there
is no other topic as to which the law is in a more unsatisfactory or
confused condition, it has seemed to the Committee and its draftsman,
Professor R. S. Stevens of Cornell, that the opportunity of establishing
uniformity in this field ought not to be lost. Section seven of the
ninth tentative draft reads as follows:
"Section 7. Corporate Capacity and Authority.-Subdivision i.
Every corporation formed under this Act shall be a body politic
and shall be deemed to have the general capacities of a natural
person, provided, however, that the limits of permissible corpo-
rate action shall be those defined and restricted by the articles
of incorporation and amendments thereof, and by the provisions
of this Act and of the other laws and the Constitution of this
State.
Sub-division III. If any acts shall have been done by a corpo-
ration in excess of its powers, the corporation's lack of power
*Professor of Law, School of Jurisprudence, Univ. of California.
1(1878) 6 CENT. L. J. 2; Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Dis-
carded? (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 49; Scarborough, Ultra Vires No Defence in Private
Contract (1923) II Ky. L. J. 197.
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to do such act shall not be inquired into collaterally, provided
that the act is one that the corporation might, at the time the
act was committed, have been formed under this Act with power
to do. Any action by a corporation in excess of its powers may
be enjoined at the suit of any shareholder. The commission by
a corporation of any act in excess of its corporate powers shall
be a ground for the forfeiture of the corporate existence at the
suit of the State, and the directors or officers engaging in such
unauthorized corporate action shall be liable to the corporation
for any damage suffered thereby in a suit by it, or by a share-
holder in case it will not or cannot sue therefor."
The tenth draft, Section nine, to be presented to the National
Conference in August, 1927, now reads as follows:
"Section 9. Corporate Capacity and Corporate Authority Dis-
tinguished.
3. A corporation which has been formed under this Act, or a
corporation existing at the time this Act took effect and of a
class which might be formed under this Act, shall have the ca-
pacity to act possessed by natural persons, but such a corpo-
ration shall have authority to perform only such acts as are neces-
sary or proper to accomplish its purposes and which are not re-
pugnant to law."
The companion section on constructive notice is Section eight,
"Purpose of Requiring Certain Papers to be Filed." This now
reads as follows:
"The filing of articles of incorporation, or amendments thereto,
and of any other papers, pursuant to the provisions of this Act,
shall not charge persons who deal with a corporation with notice
of the contents thereof."
Since the Committee desires all the cooperation it can get to make
the proposed Uniform Act meet the proper demands of present day
business, a few comments will be submitted without any attempt
to discuss the authorities. The effort to restore the law to realism
on this subject is certainly a timely and courageous one and deserves
vigorous support. The main criticism that suggests itself as to the
proposed draft is that it fails to go far enough in indicating what
practical legal consequences and changes are intended to be produced.
It attempts to repeal an artificial theory or premise, that of limited
capacity or powers, and to establish a theory of general capacity or
powers. It provides that the corporation shall have authority only
to act for the accomplishment of its corporate purposes, but fails to
show for whose benefit the limitations upon such authority are
2See Stevens, A Proposal as to The Codification and Restatement of the Ultra
Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALE, L. J. 321, 328 for original language of the com-
mittee.
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impcsed, or who can raise the question of lack of authority and
when. What are the differences between limited capacity and limited
authority to act? Will the establishment of the doctrine of general
capacity destroy the doctrine of ultra vires in whole or in part? May
executory or partly executed contracts be collaterally attacked
by either party?
The theory of the draftsman evidently is that if we wipe out the
two false premises of limited capacity and constructive notice we
shall leave the courts sufficiently free so that they can work out for
themselves a reasonable and uniform doctrine of ultra vires without
statutory guidance other than that which might be furnished by
a restatement of the law by the American Law Institute.3
It is, in brief, the view of the present writer that the law on this
topic cannot be expressed in terms of capacity or incapacity. It is
equally a fiction to say that a corporation has certain powers only,
or all the powers of an individual. The question remains, by what
principle or rule is it possible to ascertain whether a transaction is
to be attributed to the corporation? Neither in a practical sense is
it a question of the "authority" of the corporation, but rather of the
authority of the directors to bind the corporation with or without the
consent of the stockholders. The corporation by legal fiction is
deemed to have certain powers, but a corporation can act only by
having the acts of officers and agents ascribed to it. The practical
question then is not what power or capacity or authority has the
state granted to an imaginary person, but rather what authority has
the group of stockholders granted to their representatives, the
directors, to do business on their behalf.
The result isthat in general the objects and purposes clause of the
articles should operate simply like by-laws or articles of partnership,
as limitations on the actual authority of the directors and offi-
cers to bind the corporation, but not upon their ostensible
or apparent authority, unless reasonably to be inferred or actually
known. Their ostensible authority to bind the corporation would
then depend upon the nature of the business, banking, insurance,
etc., according to the actual course in which it is carried on by similar
concerns, or by that concern, very much as in the case of partner-
ships.4
3Ibid. 297, 300.4See Uniform Partnership Act, § 9. The act of every partner for apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership binds the partnership
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority so to act, and the person with
whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on his authority shall bind
the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction. No act in con-
travention of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without
the consent of all. § 18(h). See Rianhard v. Hovey, 13 Ohio 300 (,844).
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Canada, like England, has two kinds of corporations, those created
by letters patent or executive grant which are given the general
capacity possessed by corporations created by royal charter, and those
created with the limited capacity of statutory corporations. Some
Provincial Companies Acts have been amended to extend to all
corporations "the general capacity which the common law ordinarily
attached to corporations created by charter." The effect of this
grant of general capacity seems to be still more or less unsettled.
Under the general capacity doctrine could a corporation incorpo-
rated say for the purpose of carrying on the sole business of mining
lawfully carry on the business of butchering also? The general
capacity doctrine does not mean that the directors may divert the
capital of the corpoiation to unauthorized purposes or that share-
holders have no control over the nature of the business which the
directors may carry on. Even if we accept or enact the general
capacity doctrine, there is still the question of agency as in the case
of an individual or partnership. If contracts or conveyances are
attempted outside the scope of the agency of the directors, actual
or apparent, they may be enjoined. The general capacity doctrine
means that the law may attribute to the corporation such rights and
liabilities as its agents may be deemed authorized to acquire or incur
in its behalf as in the case of an individual or partnership principal.
It may sound radical and revolutionary to propose that the objects
clause of the articles should operate with no more effect than by-laws.
But is not that exactly what the learned draftsmen are driving at in
removing the doctrine of special capacity? The Ohio Act drafted
by a committee of the Ohio Bar Association with the advice of
Professor Stevens and much expert assistance, and recently adopted,
seems to carry out this idea explicitly. It follows the Uniform Act
but in Section eight adds these two clauses:
"The articles of incorporation shall constitute an agreement
by the directors and officers with the corporation that they will
confine the acts of the corporation to those acts which are author-
ized by the statements of purposes and within such limitations
and restrictions as may be imposed by the articles.
"No limitations on the exercise of the authority of the corpo-
ration shall be asserted in any action between the corporation
and any person, except by or on behalf of the corporation against
a director or officer or a person having actual knowledge of such
limitation."
5Edwards v. Blackmore, 42 Ont. L. Rep. lo5, 42 Dom. L. Rep. 280 (1918);
Thomson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires (1920) 40 CAN. L. T. 993; Thomson,
Joint.Stock Companies (1922) 42 CAN. L. T. 143, 245, 302-361; Garrett, (1922)
42 CAN. L. T. 433, 466, 478; 7 PROC. CAN. BAR. ASS'N. 382 (1922); 7 ibid. 176
(1925); Gurd, (1924) 2 CAN. BAR REv. 485, 488.
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The theory underlying this modernized Ohio corporation act is
simply that the corporation is the result of an agreement among the
parties who organized it and are conducting it, subject to proper
supervision in the interests of the public.6 Limitations of authority
contained in the articles are binding upon the directors and the officers
of the corporation and persons dealing with the corporation with
knowledge thereof. The statement of "purposes" in the articles is
binding to this extent. But the objects and powers clauses are
merely directions by the shareholders to their agents intended to
govern them in conducting the corporation's business. Those
limitations cannot be asserted to invalidate transactions with the
corporation except where the rules of agency permit.7 The burden
of proof would no doubt be on the corporation to prove that anyone
contracting with it was aware of the limitations. A contract might
doubtless be ratified by the corporation though both the corporate
agent and the third party knew when it was made that the transaction
would be ultra vires. The third party could withdraw prior to
ratification.
The distinction sometimes drawn between acts or contracts in
abuse or excess of granted powers and acts in reference to a subject
lying entirely beyond the range of objects of the corporation has
been criticized." In either case the contract is authorized or not
authorized by the charter. In either the contract is equally within
any supposed common law or statutory prohibition against all
unauthorized corporate action. There may, however, well be appar-
ent authority or estoppel in one case where there would not
be in the other. A corporation should be bound by the acts of its
agents though unauthorized and in excess of the corporate purposes
as against a party who was entitled to assume that the agents acted
within the authority conferred upon them. 9
If the third party trusting to the ostensible authority of corporate
officers, held out by the corporation to the public as worthy of credit
and confidence, contracts or changes his position in reliance upon
this appearance, the corporation should be estopped to plead its own
want of "power" or the lack of authority of the officer to bind it.
The proposition amounts to this :-That a person dealing with a
corporate officer may ordinarily rely on the implied representation
6See Report of the Committee of the Ohio Bar Ass'n., Dec. 28, 1926, at 5, 30.7See discussion as to by-laws in Putnam v. Ensign Oil Co., 272 Pa. 301, 307,
II6 Atl. 285, 287 (1922).
82 MORAWETZ, CORPORATIONS (2nd ed. 1886) §§ 704, 7o6; 3 FLETCHER, CORPO-
RATIONS (1917) §§ 1598-160o.9Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, IoI Mass. 57, 3 Am. Rep. 322, (1869)
3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1917) §§ 1591-1597.
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that an officer accredited by the directors is acting within the scope
of the corporate business, unless there is good reason to suppose
otherwise. This is particularly the case if the contract pertains to
the usual and ordinary business carried on by that corporation, and
such a contract might not under all circumstances be beyond the
authority conferred by the articles. But if the transaction is mani-
festly beyond the scope of the business of the corporation the party
dealing with the officer acts at his peril.10
In the world's business, business men cannot be expected to read
and construe the charters of corporations before each contract is
made. The charter is practically a matter of private record like the
by-laws or articles of partnership. "If the law does expect and re-
quire all who deal with the corporation to be familiar with and under-
stand the charter, the requirement is unreasonable and the expectation
is doomed to disappointment. The exigencies of ordinary business
alone will often prevent a search of corporate records. Indeed, in
many cases the search could not be made if desired.""
A conflict arises to some extent between the interests of the stock-
holders and of third persons who deal with the corporation. In some
foreign systems of law it is provided that limitations of power cannot
be set up against third persons acting in good faith. It is difficult
to find a solution which reconciles the complete security of the
stockholders with that of third persons, without requiring of them
an impracticable examination into the probable interpretation of
the charter powers.Y
The main field of conflict as to ultra vires transactions, as Professor
Stevens shows, 3 is concerned with the rights and liabilities arising
out of ultra vires contracts which are wholly or partly executory.
The so-called "estoppel" to plead ultra vires by the retention of
benefits of performance may best be explained as a species of adoption
or ratification of the contract. Under the apparent agency doctrine
even an executory ultra vires contract may be enforceable (as it is
now in certain cases of estoppel) if within the apparent scope of the
10Sturdevant v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 69 Neb. 220, 95 N. W. 819 (1903)
"J. L. Parks, Ultra Vires Transactions (1922) MO. BAR BULL., Law Series
25, p. 21. In Bissell v. Michigan Southern Railway Co., 22 N. Y. 258, (186o)
Comstock C. J. says, "A traveler from New York to Mississippi can hardly be
required to furnish himself with the charters of all the railroads on his route, or
to study a treatise on the law of corporations."12Demogue, The Impossibility of Effecting Contractual Incompetence (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 626, 629; SCHUSTER, PRINCIPLES GERMAN CIVIL LAW (1907)
§§ 52, 58. The doctrine of ultra vires has no application in the case of any German
trading corporation. No transaction entered into by one of the primary agents
of a trading corporation is invalid on the ground that it is outside of the scope
of the corporation's usual business or the objects for which it was created.13Stevens. op. cit., supra note 2, at 297, 308.
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authority of the directors. An executed conveyance or transfer on
the other hand might be subject to attack, except as protected by
ratification and estoppel, if entirely unauthorized or unsupported by
apparent authority.
The directors are something more than ordinary agents. It is
through them that the corporation lives, wills, acts and has its being.
Stockholders, like bondholders, are more in the position of lenders
and investors than of principals and proprietors. They submit their
capital and business to the direction and control of the proper officers
of the company. The law may therefore more easily infer ratification
from silent acquiescence than in the case of an individual principal
and impose a duty upon stockholders to inquire as to the conduct of
directors and officers, and to restrain such conduct if improper or
unauthorized because outside the scope of the specified corporate
business.14
The Vermont statute,5 the only one on ultra vires beside the new
Ohio act, goes to the extent of declaring that any act done in behalf
of a corporation, authorized or ratified by the directors, shall be
regarded as the act of the corporation and the corporation shall be
liable therefor, even if such act was not necessary or proper to
accomplish its purposes to the same extent as if the act had been
necessary or proper. That is, the corporation will be bound if the
act is within the apparent scope of the authority conferred upon them.
No doubt the same force would be given the articles as to the by-laws,
and third persons who join with delinquent officers in violating known
limitations could not enforce their agreements. 6
14Warren, Executory Ultra Vires Transactions (1911) 24 HARV. L. REV. 5345-37;
Stevens, op. cit., supra note 2, at 297, 331, 333.
15Vt. Laws 1915, No. 141, § 15; Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) §§ 4919, 4923.6Compare Stevens, op. cit., supra note 2, at 297, 333 note 124.
